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THE LAW OF DEAD BODIES:
IMPEDING MEDICAL PROGRESS
One of the police officers "took hold of the crank of the windlass
and after some winding brought to the surface a nude -body, the head
of which was covered with a cloth. .,. the officers' curiosity had been -
aroused and, against the protests of the young men, they removed the
cloth. Thereupon, John Harrison and George Eaton became speechless
with horror because, in spite of the absence of his long white beard
which had been ruthlessly cut off, they recognized the body hanging
before them to be none other than John Scott Harrison." The Medical
College of Ohio was the scene. 1878 was the year. The son of one
President of the United States and the father of another was the body.
A few days later a local newspaper forcefully stated, "The responsi-
bility for this outrage rests ultimately with the Legislature."' Charles
Dickens could inject a note of humor into The Tale of Two Cities
with his resurrectionist, Jerry Cruncher, but the general public found
little to laugh about as grave-robbing swept England and the United
States. Grave-robbing had become a necessity for the medical student
who could obtain dissection material from no other source. Massachusetts
in 1831 and England in 1832 passed "unclaimed bodies" or "anatomy"
laws with the very effective result that resurrectionists went out of
business, but a half-century elapsed and the Harrison case occurred be-
fore the Ohio Legislature in 1881 enacted its counterpart of those laws.2
Although there is little likelihood that "resurrectionist" will be
added to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in the mid-twentieth
century, both lawyers and legislatures are likely again to be charged
with the "responsibility" for an "outrage." In recent years popular
periodicals and medical publications have contained innumerable articles
dealing with the need and utilization of post mortem human materials.
The legal publications have revealed a dearth of articles on the legal
1 Edwards, The Famous Harrison Case and its Repercussions, 31 BULL. OF
THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 162 (March-April 1957). Dr. Linden F. Edwards,
Chairman of the Anatomy Department, Ohio State University College of Medicine,
has also written the following interesting articles: The History of Human Dis-
section, 40 OHIO ST. MED. J., No. 4 (April 1944); The Ohio .4natomy Law of
1881, 46 OHIO ST. MED. J. (1950) ; Body Snatching in Ohio During the Nineteenth
Century, 59 OHIO ST. ARcHAELOGICAL & HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (Oct. 1950);
Cincinnati's "Old Cunny", A Notorious Purv'eyor of Human Flesh, 50 OHIO ST.
MED. J., No. 5 (May 1954) ; Dr. Frederick C. Waite's correspondence with Refer-
ence to Grave Robbery, 54 OHIO ST. MED. J. 480 (April 1958).
2 MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 113, §1 (1957); OHIO REV. CODE §1713.34 (1954);
ANATOMY ACT, 1832, (Eng.) 243 WILL. 4, c. 95. For an analysis of the laws and
recent developments in the British Commonwealth see also Bentham, Donatio
Mortis Corporis, 116 J.P. 812 (1952); Bequeathing Bodies for Dissection, 98 SOL.
J. 19 (1954) ; Dead Bodies, 2 SYm. L. REV. 109 (1956).
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problems in this area.' Such problems may well exist and are likely to
become more intricate and uselessly complex due to the lack of knowl-
edge in legal circles concerning the law of dead bodies. This comment
is an attempt to explore these problems and to suggest legislation.
THE LAw OF DEAD BoDIEs
With very few exceptions since the beginnings of society man has
buried his dead in the earth. In England the ecclesiasticaal courts con-
trolled the questions of burial until they were supplanted .by the common
law courts. Primarily -because of the Judaeo-Christian concepts of "dust
to dust" and a future "resurrection," the church considered covering
with earth the only proper disposal of a dead human body.4 Ultimately
burial at sea and cremation followed by -burial of the ashes were ac-
cepted as decent modes of burial. The common law courts took over
these concepts with the result that in England and the United States
there is a legally recognized right to a decent burial. This is a right
of a living person to be accorded to him after death.5
It is natural that what constitutes "decent" burial should depend
3 Life from Death, 67 TIME 81 (May 21, 1956); Spare Parts for People,
211 HARPERS 74 (July 1956) ; What I am Going to do After Death, 83 AMERICAN
MERCURY 29 (Sept. 1956); Bruner, Service After Death, TOLEDO BLADE, June 3,
1957. Brown, Fryer, Randall, & Lu, Postmortem Homografts, 138 ANNALS OF SURe.
618 (1953); Woodburne & Gardner, Anatomical Materials and Anatomical Laws,
8 BULL. FOR MED. RESEARCH 10 (1954); Hemphill & Brown, Skin Storage in
Tissue Banking, 14 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURG. 118 (1954); Cullipher, The
Organization and Operation of a Bone Bank, 20 AM. J. OF MED. TECHNOLOGY 354
(1954); Brown & Fryer, Bringing Skin to Life, 70 LIFE AND HEALTH 14 (1955);
Brown, Fryer, & Zaydon, Skin Bank for Postmortem Homografts, 101 SURG. GYN.
& OBSTETRICS 401 (1955) ; The Cadaver Business, 159 J.A.M.A. 21 (1955); Brown,
Fryer, & Zaydon, Establishing a Skin Bank, 16 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURG.
337 (1955); Special Report on the Supply of Anatomical Material, 10 BULL. FOR
MED. RESEARCH 10 (1955); Report of the Committee on Blood lessel Banks,
13 CIRCULATION 270 (1956); Brown, Fryer, Zaydon & King, Skin Fiability Follow-
ing Preservation, 6 SURG. FORUM 577 (1956); Willed Bodies Key to the Future,
11 BULL. FOR MED. RESEARCH 8 (1957). The "Skin" articles by Brown and Fryer
show the fascinating development of skin homotransplantations. Apparently, there
is only one lead article in American legal publications: Vestal, Taber, & Shoemaker,
Medico-Legal Aspects of Tissue Homotransplantation, 18 DET. L.J. 271 (1954)
(Hereinafter cited as Homotransplantation).
4 Matter of Johnson, 169 Misc. 215 (1938) ; JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS
6, 24 (2d ed. 1950) ; LmTON, THE TREE OF CULTURE (1955) ; Homotransplantation,
supra note 3; cf. In re Widening of Beekman Street, 4 Brad. 503 (N.Y. 1857),
where Ruggles maintains that the common law right to burial derives from the
pre-Christian era.
5 Persinger v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315, 54 Ohio L.Abs. 295, 86 N.E.2d 335
(1949); Kanavan's Case, 1 Me. 726 (1821); Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co.,
220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917) ; Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574 (1875);
Kitchen v. Wilkinson, 26 Pa. Super. 75 (1904); Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery,




upon the wishes of the deceased, the desires of his relatives, and the
mores of his culture. The most that can be said definitely is that this
is a right to be buried or cremated as soon as possible after death (the
body's condition remaining the same as at the time of death) and to
remain interred.6
The litigated questions concerning the right to decent burial are
comparatively few and revolve around the manner and place of burial.
Their resolution always depends upon a balancing of the interests of the
deceased, his relatives, and the community.7 However, whether explicit
or implicit, it is the opinion and needs of the community which are over-
riding. Although burial in a cheap wood box in a woodlot, lack of
religious services, absence of relatives and friends do not deprive a burial
of its decency,& acts such as casting into a stream or stuffing into a
furnace9 which are extremely repugnant to the community's sentiments
or which may affect the health and welfare of the community do violate
the right. Altering the condition of the body at death by autopsy does
not violate the right of decent burial if it is necessary for the detection
of crime or determination of civil liability, both of which are considered
by courts to be necessary for the welfare of the community in according
justice to the living.'0 In the exercise of its function to settle contro-
versies among relatives as to place or manner of burial, the equity court
gives great weight to the desires of the deceased," buf often accedes to
the wishes of the relatives if this action seems the more socially accept-
able solution. In a typical case of this kind the court overruled the clear
desires of the deceased and his blood relatives to order his burial in the
city where his widow and three-year-old daughter resided so that the
child would be able to visit the grave of her father.'2
As a correlative to the right of decent burial the law generally has
imposed the duty of according that right upon the surviving spouse, then
6 Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 At. 878 (1904); see cases collected
in Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 472 (1952).
7 Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 498, 149 S.W. 871 (1912); Fox v.
Gordon, 16 Phila. 185 (Pa. 1883) ; Jackson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 29.
8 Seaton v. Commonwealth, supra note 7.
9 Kanavan's Case, supra note 5; State v. Bradbury, 136 Me. 34-7, 9 A.2d 657
(1939).
10 Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Rossi, 35 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1929) ; Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. McCulloch, 31 F.Supp. 800 (D.C.W.Va. 1940), reversed for lack
of sufficient grounds, 109 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1940); Wehle v. United States Mut.
Ace. Ass'n., 153 N.Y. 116, 47 N.E. 35 (1897).
1"Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228, 61 N.W. 84-2 (1895); Larson v. Chase,
47 Minn. 307, 50 N.,. 238 (1891) ; Fidelity Union Trust v. Heller, 16 N.J. Super.
285, 84 A.2d 485 (1951); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320,
186 N.E. 798 (1933) ; Smiley v. Bartlett, 3 Ohio C.C.D. 432 (1892) ; Goldman v.
Mollen, 168 Va. 34-5, 191 S.E. 627 (1937).
12 Herold v. Herold, 16 Ohio Dec. 303, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 405 (1905).
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the next of kin, and finally, in the absence of kin, upon the public.' 3
Since the concept of decent burial depends upon the interests of the
deceased, his relatives, arid the community, the satisfaction of the duty
must meet all these interests as far as possible. A number of courts have
said the duty is a "sacred trust" upon the one primarily responsible with
his responsibility running to all these interests."4
The law has recognized in the kin having the duty of burial a
right to possession of the body so that the duty can be carried out. This
is a right to receive possession of the body immediately and in the same
condition it was in at the time of death. There is also a correlative duty
imposed upon anyone who may have the possession not to mutilate the
body and to deliver possession. The right to possession of the body
exists only in order to aid the accomplishment of the duty of burial and,
therefore, should only be co-extensive with that duty. 5 However, con-
fusion exists in most of the cases where a remedy is sought for inter-
ference with this right. The confusion was brought about because the
common law has tiresomely repeated since the time of Lord Coke that
there is no property in a dead body."8 The courts, precluded from
labeling this a property right, found it difficult to give a remedy. In the
effort to place it into an existing legal cubby-hole, the concept of a
"quasi-property" interest in the body was born.' 7 Probably the majority
of courts today state that "although there is no property in a dead body
in the commercial sense, there is a quasi-property right." A few courts
ignore or distinguish Lord Coke's analysis and conclude that there is a
property right.'" A very few wisely recognize that a right to possession
exists and that a remedy can be given without twisting the right into
some other legal classification.'" The court in the Pettigrew case points
1 3
-Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra note 5; Fox v. Gordon, supra note
7; McClellen v. Filson, 44 Ohio St. 184, 5 N.E. 861 (1886) ; Love v. Aetna Casualty
Co., 132 Tex. 280, 99 S.W.2d 646 (1936), aff'd, 135 Tex. 53, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938).
This duty was originally stated as that of the householder where death occurred,
JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 37.
1 4 Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra note 5; Fox v. Gordon, supra note
7; Larson v. Chase, supra note 11; Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan,
21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161 (1925) ; Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 Atl. 273
(1927).
15 Finley v. Atlantic Transport, supra note 5; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
supra note 6; Doxtator v. Chicago & W.M. Ry., 121 Mich. 90, 79 N.W. 922 (1899) ;
Hassard v. Lehane, 143 App. Div. 424, 128 N.Y.S. 161 (1911); Koerber v. Patek,
123 Wisc. 435, 102 N.W. 40 (1905); See also JAcKSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at
124; cases collected in Annot. 88 A.L.R. 984 (1934).
16 Nearly every legal source cited in this article will refer to this concept.
17pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra note 5; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
supra note 6.
18 Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134 (1859).
19Larson v. Chase, supra note 11; Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Morgan, supra note 14; Hassard v. Lehane, supra note 15; Love v. Aetna Casualty
supra note 13; Farley v. Carson, 8 Ohio Dec. Repr. 119 (1880).
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out that whichever of these views is followed, the results should" be
identical in protecting a right which is only co-extensive with the duty
of burial. However, a further confusing factor has appeared in more
recent times. Most of the "dead-body" litigation is concerned with
alleged violations or determination of this right to possession. The piling
up of years of precedent on this point has caused a tendency to overlook
the fact that this right is derivative from the more basic right of decent
burial. Especially in those courts which have labeled this a property or
"quasi-property" right, the tendency is to over-emphasize the kin's right
to the point of absoluteness and to the exclusion of the rights of others.
20
This is particularly unfortunate since there exists another right-vague
though it may be.
This is a right in the surviving relatives and presumably the public,
whether or not given the duty of disposing of the body. It would seem
that it should be a right to insure that the deceased will be accorded his
right to a decent burial. Some courts have included this within the
original right, so that they consider the right of burial as belonging not
only to the deceased but also to the survivors.2 ' Since the right of decent
burial depends partially upon the feelings of the surviving relatives and
of the community, and the duty is a "sacred trust" running to them,
this is undoubtedly the correct conclusion. The few courts which have
overemphasized the right in the one who has the duty of burial to the
exclusion of others' interests refuse remedies to these others.22
The anatomy laws of the nineteenth century changed the common
law right to immediate burial intact and relieved the public of the duty
of according such a burial in certain cases. These laws in 44 juris-
dictions provide that unclaimed indigents otherwise required to be buried
at public expense may be delivered to the state anatomical board or to
medical schools or physicians for distribution and anatomical study.23
Although these laws represent the first major change in the community
attitude toward "decent" burial by legalizing dissection, the component
parts of the laws reveal that an anathema to dissection existed. Many
of according such a burial in certain cases. These laws in 44 juris-
organizations, fraternal orders, and religious organizations can claim the
bodies. A number of them exempt bodies of honorably discharged
veterans and travelers who died suddenly "unless the stranger or traveler
belongs to that class commonly known as tramps." Dissection apparently
was looked upon as a disgrace fit for tramps but not for one who had
20 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, supra note 11; Bogert v. Indiana-
polis, supra note 18; Trammel v. City of New York, 193 Misc. 356, 82 N.Y.S.2d 762
(1948), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 781, 93 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1949). The court in Southern
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, supra note 14, recognizes this error.
21This is a plausible explanation for the "sacred trust' language in Boyle
v. Chandler, supra note 14, and the other cases cited supra note 14.
22Trammel v. City of New York, sutra note 20.
23 See Appendix I for citations of these statutes.
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gloriously served his country. The careful restrictions as to use for
anatomical study only and for use only within the state, the time periods
for which the body must be held, the possibility of claiming the body at
any time, all indicate that the laws were drafted to stop grave-robbing
and not primarily to aid medical science. Nevertheless the legal change
caused a halt to grave-robbing by supplying an adequate number of
cadavers to meet the demands of the times. The flamboyant newspaper
articles stopped, and the public's imprecation of anatomical study could
begin to wane.
The deceased's right to a decent burial with its correlative duty in
relatives or the public, the relative's right to possession of the body with
its resulting duty on anyone else having the possession, and the provisions
of the anatomy laws constitute the bases for the practical and legal diffi-
culties involved in the need for and use of post mortem human materials
by medical science.
THE NEED FoP, CADAVER MATERIAL
Unfortunately the anatomy laws which were a boon to medical
science in the last century are rapidly becoming totally inadequate. The
two particularly pressing needs are a supply of cadavers for anatomical
study -by the increasing number of medical, dental, embalming, nursing,
chiropractic, and osteopathic students, and a supply of human parts for
therapeutic purposes.
A ratio of two anatomy students to one body is ideal. In 1955
there were at least eight medical schools where the current ratio of four
to one could not 'be sustained and one school where it was not possible
to maintain a ratio of eight to one. A survey questionaire as to whether
or not the supply of cadavers was ample received twenty-seven answers
of "no," while fifteen others indicated "adequate, but not ample." The
School of Medicine at Western Reserve University reports that its sup-
ply is now entirely inadequate. Other surveys indicate that approxi-
mately fifty per cent of the medical schools are burdened by this prob-
lem and that the shortage is becoming more acute.2" Since the anatomy
acts generally give medical schools preference, it is probably correct to
assume that schools of embalming, chiropractic and osteopathic medicine,
nursing, and others tangentially connected with medicine have few or
no cadavers for use in anatomical study.
A second demand for dead human bodies has developed only in
very recent years. This is for homotransplantation, rehabilitation, or
-therapeutics. The existence of corneal transplants and eye banks are
fairly well known. However, there are a number of other types of
24Woodburne & Gardner, Anatomical Materials and Anatomical Laws,
8 BULL. FOR MEO. RESEARCH 10 (1954); The Cadaver Business, 159 J.A.M.A. 21
(1955); The Supply of Cadavers, 10 BULL. FOR MED. RESEARCH 11 (1955) ; Willed
Bodies-Key to the Future, 11 BULL. FOR MED. RESEARcH 8 (1957). Interview with
Dr. Linden F. Edwards, April 18, 1958.
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banks for human parts. Although homografts of human skin will not
"take" permanently, they have been found to be much more effective
for temporary covering than artificial dressings. They are so effective
in preventing leakage of body fluids that lives which otherwise would
have been lost are saved by homografts. With existing methods of
preservation, skin can be banked up to sixty days and research is now
developing methods of indefinite preservation. Experts working in this
field feel that national defense and disaster plans could be instituted
through which skin would be available for saving the lives of persons
extensively burned by military or civilian disasters.2 5 Another life-
saving technique utilizes the transplantation of arteries, which can be
banked in much the same manner as skin. The procurement, preserva-
tion; and implantation of these grafts has become an important factor
in the surgical correction of cardiovascular lesions.26 A third rehabilita-
tion use is that of -bone which is also banked. Although it has not yet
been extensively acquired from post- mortem sources, the indications
point to success in this use. 7 This writer has not exhausted the medical
journals but feels that other transplantations either are or soon will be
utilized; for example, within the last few months there was an attempt
to transplant an organ, the kidney, 'between two people who were not
identical twins.2" The possibilities of transfering organs from recently
deceased bodies dre not too remote for speculation.2" Even without
future speculation, it is obvious that at present the need for these human
parts exceeds the supply. The Boston Eye Bank reports that they receive
about fourteen eyes (not pairs) a month and could easily utilize twice
that number.30
When one considers the great population increase of recent years
and that only abaout one-third of one per cent (5,000) of the bodies
25 See series of articles by Brown and Fryer, supra note 3; Homotrans-
plantation, supra note 3. Personal communications have given me much of the
information in this section.
26 See Report of Committee on Blood Vessel Banks and Homotransplantation,
supra note 3. Dr. Rudolf J. Noer of the University of Louisville School of
Medicine in a personal communication, May 7, 1958, stated that the artery grafts:
"(1) replace segments of injured vessels, (2) replace a vessel which has developed
an aneurysm, (3) replace a vessel occluded by an arteriosclerotic plague, (4) re-
place a vessel that must be removed because of involvement by neoplasm."
27 See Cullipher, supra note 3.
2 8 Medicine, 71 TINTE 77 (April 28, 1958).
2 9 Science, 71 TIME 47 (June 2, 1958) ; Science Nears a Goal: Bank of Vital
Organs, 45 LiFE 104 (July 14, 1958).
30 Letter from Nancy Hunt, Executive Secretary, April 30, 1958; Dr. Noer
supra note 26, also wrote: "The quantity of material that we obtain both for the
Artery Bank and for the Skin Bank is not sufficient to meet our needs. Frequently
arteries are replaced by various artificial grafts employing nylon, dacron or a
combination of such material due to the shortages of homograft arteries. Similarly,
the Skin Bank does not contain skin at all times, when it is urgently needed for
coverage of a person who has suffered severe third degree burns."
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which die each year in the United States would adequately fill the need
f9r cadavers for anatomical study, it seems inconceivable that such a
shortage does exist. A number of factors have combined to create this
shortage. The first of these factors is the increasing number of autop-
sies performed to learn the cause of death or to obtain material for
basic research.31 These purposes may even 'be considered two other uses
of the dead human body. A radical autopsy disturbs or removes most of
the viscera so that the -body is no longer suitable for anatomical study.
The impact of social welfare legislation on the anatomy laws has
been devastating. As indicated earlier, the anatomy laws only provide
that unclaimed dead be used for anatomical study. The primary reason
for not claiming the indigent dead is lack of funds with which to bury
them. Today this situation seldom exists, not only because of increased
standards of living but because so many laws provide the means for
burial. Most states have veterans' relief legislation comparable to that
in Ohio where a fair and reasonable price may be incurred by a county
commission for the burial of any soldier, sailor, marine, army nurse,
or mother, wife, or widow of any of these.32 The Federal Social Se-
curity Act provides that up to $225 is available to be paid not only to
the widow or widower but also to "anyone equitably entitled thereto"
for expenses he has incurred in the ,burial of an insured deceased.3" In
Ohio the Workmen's Compensation Act provides up to $400 for funeral
and burial expenses, while the Aid for the Aged legislation allows up
to $180.3 4 This social legislation not only gives the means to relatives
and close friends to claim and bury the deceased, but it has also increased
the operations of "curbstone undertakers," those unsavory characters
who claim the bodies and bury them cheaply in order to collect a small
profit from whatever government agency provides the funds.3 5 Further-
more, some medical authorities state that the welfare officials interpret
this legislation as taking precedence over the anatomy laws so that they
refuse to turn over the unclaimed bodies for anatomical study if there
are public funds available with which to bury them. 6 The State of
Florida has no such social legislation, -but requires undertakers to provide
burial as a public service; consequently, the supply of cadavers for
3 1 Woodburne & Gardner, supra note 24; THE BOSTON EYE BANK TEN YEAR
REPORT (1956); THE EYE-BANK FOR SIGHT RESTORATION INC., NEW YORK, ANNUAL
REPORT (1957). Interview with Dr. Edwards, supra note 24.
3 2 OHIO REV. CODE §5901.25 (1953).
33 60 STAT. 986 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §402 (1952).
3 4 OHIO REV. CODE §§4123.66, 5105.15 (1953).
35 Some Shortages and Some Causes, 10 BULL. FOR MED. RESEARCH 12 (1955);
Willed Bodies, supra note 24.
3 6 Ibid. Even after delivery to the Ohio State University Medical School,
six to ten bodies a year are claimed by state welfare agencies which assert their
right to bury them, Interview with Dr. Linden F. Edwards, June 11, 1958.
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anatomical study there is more than ample.3 7
Certain provisions in the anatomical laws or the enforcement of
the laws also contribute to the shortage. Some of the statutes provide
that the state shall bury the bodies if relatives or friends merely so
request; some agencies follow this practice even though the statute does
not permit it." Some of the statutes do not require the agencies to
notify the anatomical board or medical schools of the availability of a
body; in some instances where it is required such notification is not
made. 39 Many of the statutes permit charitable organizations to claim
the bodies. There are a great many more such organizations today than
existed at the time these laws were passed. Also, fraternal and religious
organizations, probably having more money than ever before, are per-
mitted to claim and -bury their members' bodies. Even the provisions
allowing friends to claim are sometimes abused, since very few of the
laws provide for determining whether it is actually a personal friend
who claims the body. For example, the medical schools at the Uni-
versity of Michigan and The Ohio State University report that they no
longer receive -bodies from the state penitentiaries because the inmates
have provided the means to claim all bodies through the establishment of
burial funds.
40
There are also sections in some of the anatomy laws which are
outmoded, creating a hindrance to the use of the bodies received for
anatomical study. Some of the state laws require that the dissected bodies
be interred or buried. Since the passage of the anatomy acts, cremation
has become more widely accepted as a form of decent disposal, and it is,
of course, much more convenient and inexpensive for the medical
schools to cremate than to bury. It is the practice of at least one school
in Ohio to do so even though the Ohio statute specifies "the remains
thereof shall be interred in some suitable place."' 4 1 When the NeW York
statute contained a similar clause in the penal section, a civil action for
$25,000 against New York University for wrongful dissection and cre-
mation was sustained on demurrer on the ground, inter &lia, that cre-
mating was a wrongful act for which a civil action would lie. Shortly
afterwards the statute was amended to allow cremation. 42 A second
hindrance in the statutes is the requirement that the bodies or parts
thereof must 'be kept -within the state. These sections were included to
37 Florida-Where There Isn't Atny Trouble, 10 BULL. FOR MED. RESEARCH
23 (1955).
38 Supra note 35. See Appendix I for citations of these statutes.
30 The Weight of the Lau-its Effect in Securing Cadavers, 10 BULL. FOR
MED. RESEARCH 17 (1955); Willed Bodies, supra note 24. Although the Ohio
statute requires notification there is no penalty for failure to do so, and many
notifications are not made. (Source of information withheld.)
40 Interview with Dr. Edwards, supra note 24.
41 OHIo REV. CODE §1713.36 (1953).
42 Burke v. New York University, 196 App. Div. 491, 188 N.Y.S. 123 (1921)
N.Y. PENI. §2215.
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halt "bootlegging" over state lines by resurrectionists. When medical or
scientific meetings are held which members of the profession attend
from various states, an individual may be asked to give a demonstration
for which he is expected to bring his own material from out of state.
He does bring the material even though he knows that it violates the
letter of the law. Another problem is that of unlimited time to claim
the body. If the medical schools attempted to adhere to the strict statute
which permits claimants to take the body at any time, the schools would
have to identify, segregate, and label every infinitesimal part of the
body as it is dissected-a burdensome task. Also, a particular student
keeps his body throughout the length of the particular anatomy course,
and his study is interrupted and less efficient when the body is claimed
and he must start on a new one. Some statutes also allow the claimant
to take the body from the medical school at no cost whatsoever. These
bodies are already embalmed so that the claimant is spared that expense
while the school receives no benefit from having incurred it.
For the therapeutic use of post mortem human materials the
anatomy laws are of no benefit. Nearly all of these laws specify that
the unclaimed bodies are to ,be used for anatomical study only. Further-
more, most of them require a waiting period before the bodies may be
used. One of the practical problems of homotransplantation is that of
the race against time. It is the fortunate time differential between
cessation of breathing and circulation and the final death of the various
parts of the human body that permits any post mortem use of the body
at all. However, self-destruction of the body cells begins quickly,
creating an urgency to remove the part to be used as soon as possible
after death: for the eyes within two hours, for skin within 24 hours if
the body is refrigerated, for -blood vessels within six or eight hours.4 3 If
therapeutic use is to be made there must be some legal method by which
to obtain the material from a recently deceased person immediately after
his death.
THE EXISTING LEGAL PROBLEMS
As they did in the days of the resurrectionists, the people of the
medical profession seem to be surging beyond the law in their quest to
solve the practical problems of supply and use of post mortem ma-
terials.44 It is largely due to the uncertainties in this area of the law
43 Letter from Dr. Noer, supra note 26; see articles cited supra note 3. Also,
the increasing magnitude of the problem is evident when one considers these figures
from the REPORT OF THE NEW YORK EYE BANK FOR SIGHT RESTORATION, supra note
31: Eye Donor Pledges signed-1955-56, 2,200; 1956-57, 28,900.
44 A decided difference of opinion has been expressed. The conclusion of
the authors of the article in the University of Detroit Law Journal, Homotrans-
Plantation, supra note 3, is that probably no legal difficulties exist. It has not
been my intention to refute or to answer that article, but rather, to balance it.
That article contains statements which indicate that the authors were a bit dubious
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that the man engaging in the activities analyzed in the ensuing discussion
is subjecting himself to a risk of severe civil or criminal liability, the
repercussions of which could be damaging to the medical profession as
a whole. The obvious violation of laws -by cremating when statutes re-
quire burial and by transporting bodies or their parts over state lines has
already been mentioned. The following problems involve the varying
degrees of consent given for utilization of a dead body.
Consent Not Given
An autopsy is an examination of the body by dissection to deter-
mine the cause of death. Without authorization such an examination is
illegal. Even when an autopsy is authorized, parts, larger than necessary
for microscopic examination, are sometimes removed during the exami-
nation and not thereafter returned, without the prior permission of the
deceased or his relatives. It has been suggested that this is the greatest
readily available source of material for transplantations.4 5 Unless there
is some legal justification for this practice, the right of decent buriaf
intact and the right of the next of kin to receive possession of the whole
body have been violated.
The possible justification put forward is that this is the customary
practice and therefore consent or authorization for the autopsy includes
consent or authorization to remove parts permanently.4 This argument
is untenable. In order for custom to form the basis of an implied con-
sent it must be: (1) so generally known, at least among the parties in-
volved, that knowledge can be attributed to them, (2) certain and uni-
form, (3) followed for a considerable period of time, and (4) not
contrary to established legal principles or public policy.4" Outside of
medical and legal circles the practice of removing parts is little known.
Transplantation is such a recent development that removal for that pur-
pose could not be generally known. The average person giving autopsy
consent cannot be charged with notice of such a little known fact.
Also, it is highly questionable whether there is a uniform practice of
removing parts. Some writers have relied on the fact that unusual
specimens have been retained for exhibition or scientific demonstrations,
but this hardly constitutes a custom of wholesale removal and retention.
In In re Disinterment of Body of Jaris4" the court quoted and relied upon
of their conclusion. The point I make is that their dubiousness is well founded;
clarifying legislation is warranted because of the prevailing uncertainties and
risks.
45 Homotranspiantation, supra note 3.
46 Ibid. Price, Legal Rights and Duties in Regard to Dead Bodies, Post-
Mortems, Dissections, 68 So. AFro L. J. 403 (1951).
47 See discussion and cases cited in: 55 Arm. JUR., Usages & Customs 263
25 C.J.S., Customs & Usages 76. Cf. Note, Customs and Trade Usage, 55 COL. L.
REV. 1192 (1955).
48 2 4 4 Iowa 1025, 58 N.V.2d 24 (1953).
1958]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the testimony of two physicians who defined autopsy as the "removal and
replacement" of parts. (Emphasis supplied.) Even though parts may be
retained when an extended laboratory analysis is required to determine the
cause of death, this is removal within the very narrow purpose for which
the autopsy was permitted, and the court in the Jarvis case went to great
lengths to assure that no portion greater than necessary would be so re-
tained. Moreover, removal for transplantation is certainly not a uniform
practice and has been occurring for an extremely short period of time.
Such a "custom" seems to be in direct contravention of law and
public policy.4" It must -be remembered that the policy is for burial intact.
The exceptions to this policy were made ,by the common law and statutes
to aid in the determination of legal liability, and they are limited strictly to
acts necessary in order to ascertain the cause of death.5" Transplantation
is an entirely new concept. It serves to rehabilitate a person not connected
in any way with the rights and liabilities of those who dealt with the
deceased person from whom the tissues were taken. There is no legal prin-
ciple or policy which would accord with the practice of removal of parts
for therapeutic use, but such removal does infringe rights recognized for
hundreds of years.5 Especially since courts are more likely to develop
rules for the preservation of justice than of medicine, it is hardly conceiv-
able that a court would deny recovery to a distraught widow whose
husband's body has been partially dismantled and attached to various
living persons in flagrant violation of her right to bury her husband whole.
If there is no authority to remove parts for transplantation, such
action could also result in criminal guilt under a statute such as Ohio
Revised Code section 2923.08:
No person, not lawfully authorized so to do, shall mutilate
or destroy any portion of a dead human body. Whoever
violates this section shall be fined not more than ten thousand
dollars or imprisoned not less than one or more than ten years.
Consent of Deceased
One of the most effective ways for medical science to obtain bodies
for anatomical study and therapeutics is by the permission of the deceased
himself.52 At least fifteen states have specific statutes or other statutory
49 Cf., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548, 87 So.
115 (1921), where the court went so far as to hold void because contra to public
policy an insurance contract permitting exhumation and autopsy to ascertain the
cause of death.
50 Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., supra note 5; In re Jarvis, supra note
48; In re Disinterment of Tow, 243 Iowa 695, 53 N.W.2d 283 (1952) ; Winkler v.
Hawkes & Ackley, 126 Iowa 474, 102 N.W. 418 (1905).
rl Koerber v. Patek, supra note 15 Hassard v. Lehane, supra note 15.
Even the unusual decision in Farley v. Carson, supra note 19, which denied re-
covery for an unauthorized autopsy carefully noted that nothing was removed
from the body.
52 See articles cited supra note 3.
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language which apparently permit such donation by the deceased.53 These
statutes will be discussed in the last section of this article. Without such a
statute efforts to make such donations can be thwarted.
It is not practicable for the deceased to attempt to bequeath his body
in his will because ordinarily it has been buried before the will is read or
probated. If this means is chosen nevertheless, it will -be ineffectual in those
jurisdictions which hold that a body is not property and therefore cannot
be the subject of a bequest. If the will contains no other bequests, it may
be denied probate. 4 It is believed that finding the authority for the right
to dispose of a body by will in the many cases containing statements that
the wishes of certain relatives will be followed "in the absence of testa-
mentary disposition" is unfounded. First, the phrase is usually dicta since
these cases involve no testamentary disposition or, at most, only directions
as to place of burial. 5 Second, most of the cases cited for support are from
New York which has contained in its statutes since 1881 the following
language: "A person has the right to direct the manner in which his body
shall be disposed of after death." 6 Third, these courts recognize that the
deceased's attempted testamentary disposition is not controlling.5"
Donation of his body by the deceased made before his death is at the
present time a widespread practice, both for supplying the anatomists and
the various tissue banks. Many of the forms for this purpose have no pro-
vision for obtaining the consent of the next of kin.5" Although the chances
53 See Appendix II for citations of these statutes.
54 Fidelity Union Trust v. Heller, supra note 11; Herold v. Herold, supra
note 12; Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac. 170 (1900); Haghurst v. Haghurst,
4 Ohio L. Abs. 375 (1926); THomPSON, WLLS §561 (3d ed. 194-7).
5 Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra note 5; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
supra note 6; Fox v. Gordon, supra note 7; O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 288, 55
Pac. 906 (1899). The court in Enos v. Snyder, supra note 54, made clear that in
the O'Donnell case "the point was not involved"; Painter v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 123 Md. 301, 91 Atl. 158 (1914) ; Hardin v. Ehring, 22 Ohio App.
437, 155 N.E. 153 (1926).
5 6 Homotransplantation, supra note 3, nn. 63, 64, & 66; N.Y. PuB. HEALTH
§4201; N.Y. PEN. §2210.
57 Apparently the only case involving a will which contained nothing other
than a bequest of the body for scientific purposes is Matter of Johnson, supra note
4, where the will was admitted to probate as a testamentary instrument. However,
a year later in New York another surrogate's court stated that there are only
personal rights in one's body and these are not subject to testamentary disposition,
therefore, such a disposition is not testamentary in character and can be dis-
regarded or altered if evidence of a later desire is shown, Matter of Scheck,
172 Misc. 236, 123 N.Y.2d 784 (1939). See also, Fidelity Union Trust v. Heller,
supra note 11.
58 One form received by the author reads as follows:
I herewith state that it is my desire to donate my body immediately after
my death to the School of Medicine, ------------------ University, for teaching
purposes, scientific research, or for such purposes as the authorized representatives
of said University shall in their sole discretion deem advisable. Whenever possi-
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are that close relatives will know of the deceased's wishes and cooperate
to carry them out, many reported cases concern relatives attempting to
exert their own preferences, either in complete disregard of what the de-
ceased wanted or because there is doubt as to what his wishes were at the
time of death. Assuming that it is clear that at the time of death the de-
ceased wanted his body donated to science, the great weight given to his
desires is not controlling because the right to a decent burial depends also
upon the desires of the relatives and the community. Therefore, the de-
ceased alone could not waive the right. The equity court looks to these
interests and constitutes itself an umpire to settle the question. If the dona-
tion were of a part of the body for transplantation, the race against time
in removing the part precludes the use of it if any objection is made by
any relative.59 There simply is not time to wrangle over the problem or
to have a court umpire the conflicting interests. Even when the donation
is for anatomical study only, the medical profession would not become
embroiled in a legal difficulty with the claiming relatives if it could he
avoided. The unfortunate risk that is entailed when only the deceased's
permission is received, whether it be for autopsy, study, or transplantation,
is that after the scientific use has -been made the relatives may institute a
damage suit which the medical people could not avoid and very likely
would lose. In a jurisdiction where it is held that the deceased has no pro-
perty in his body but that the next of kin charged with the duty of burial
does have, it takes little imagination to envisage the dire results to anyone
who has tampered with the body.
Consent of Relatives
Another method of obtaining the 'bodies is to receive the consent of
the relatives, either before or after the death, but not that of the deceased.
This is essentially the same problem as that discussed above: two interests
in determining what constitutes decent burial are ignored; this time it is
the deceased and the community. Recent cases have loosely referred to the
right of the kin to "dispose of the body"; the authors of the Homotrans-
plantation article perceptably change from writing of "burial" to writing
of "disposition." There is no case authority in point and no apparent legal
ble I desire that my eyes shall be donated to the eye bank for sight restoration.
A copy of this statement is on file with the Professor of Anatomy --------
----- University. Immediately after my decease he should be
notified, ---------------------- in order that he may take the necessary action
to implement this request.
Date --------------------- Name ------------------------------------
Address -------------..--------------------
59 "The time lag between death and obtaining consent for removal of tissue
does seriously hamper us, if the nearest relative cannot be reached, or if the
patient's family has difficulty in deciding whether or not to give consent for
obtaining material, the time elapsed might be of sufficient length to make the




principle with which to buttress the conclusion that disposition by donating
to science is the equivalent of according the common law right of decent
burial. The closest thing to it would be those cases which have erroneously
overlooked the fact that the rights in the kin are only co-extensive with
what is necessary in order to accomplish the duty of decent burial, and
have concluded that the kin have a near absolute right to dispose of the
body as they wish. However, these cases have dealt primarily with the place
of burial or the right to get possession of the body. Since the courts gene-
rally feel -that every human wants to be laid to rest in the earth without
mutilation of his body,"0 it is likely that scientific use of the body without
the permission of the deceased would be held to violate his right of decent
burial.
Consent of Deceased and Relatives
The obvious conclusion to be reached from this discussion is that the
best manner of obtaining post mortem materials for scientific purposes is
to have the permission of 'both deceased and relatives before death. For
therapeutic uses it would be essential to have the relatives' permission before
death so that no time would be wasted in contacting them. For anatomical
study it is probably of no consequence when the permission is obtained;
however, it may be easier emotionally for the relatives to give it in advance
of death. Since the cases are fairly uniform in giving weight to the wishes
of both the deceased and his relatives, there are only two sources of legal
difficulty in this method. The first involves determining which relatives'
consent must be obtained. This will -be discussed later. The other source
is the community attitude. Assuming for the moment that someone does
have standing to sue, the court's determination of whether a cause of action
exists, where both the deceased and close kin have consented to scientific use
of the body, will -be entirely dependent upon whether the policy or mores
of the society regards such use as within the concept of decent burial.
Early in this article mention was made of the community's changing
concepts which have approved cremation rather than burial intact and
autopsies when necessary to aid justice. The anatomy acts themselves con-
stituted a legislative declaration of a public policy which under limited
circumstances approved of dissection. These acts gave an aura of respecta-
bility to dissection which over the years has decreased the public anathema
to the practice. It was also indicated that community attitude appears to be
influential only when the public health is adversely affected or the acts
done are extremely repugnant to the community sentiments. Since no
public health objection would be involved, the question before a court
would be whether the particular scientific use contemplated was repugnant
to the community. There may well 'be a difference in result depending
upon whether the use is for transplantation or for anatomical study.
60 Thompson v. Deeds supra note 11; American Citizen Labor & Protective
Inst. v. Wesley, 9 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1928).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The publicity concerning transplantations has been frequent and
favorable. More and more donations of parts to banks are being made
without contest. There is a definite and direct benefit to mankind which
the public readily sees and grasps when a corneal transplant gives miracu-
lous sight to the blind. There are few, if any, specific laws which indicate
a negative policy toward transplantation itself. In Italy, even though he
openly violated the law, the priest who gave his eyes to restore sight to a
child not only received wide acclaim but also brought about a change in
the Italian law."' The public's enthusiam for the concept of giving life
from death by transplantation is such that one doubts that a court, faced
with permission of deceased and relatives, would declare that transplan-
tation is repugnant to the community sentiments. Although it is hoped and
expected that the enthusiasm for transplantation is the backdoor to complete
approval of dissection for anatomical study, it is not so clear that that door
is now opened wide. Members of the medical profession are hesitant on
the subject and doubt the public's support.62 The benefit to the public
flows through such a remote and devious channel from the young student
before his dissecting table to the experienced surgeon at the operating table
that the public does not so readily grasp the importance to them of ana-
tomical study. Compared to transplantations there is little favorable publi-
city. Perhaps most important is the fact that there exists a long and nega-
tive legal history concerning the problem. The riminal cases for illegal
dissection and grave-robbing set the policy of the common law which the
anatomy acts only narrowly changed. The acts included or were ac-
companied by language forbidding the "possession of a corpse for the pur-
pose of medical, surgical, and anatomical study except in conformity to
the provisions of the law." (Emphasis added.) Since these statutes are in
derogation of the common law, they will be construed strictly to permit
only what their language precisely permits. Furthermore, the social legis-
lation of the past twenty-five years providing burial funds for so many
groups indicates, if anything, a policy for immediate burial whenever
possible. To predict a court's decision as to the community policy or senti-
ment toward dissection for anatomical study would be hazardous. The
hopes that such a decision would be favorable cannot remove the lingering
risk arising from the uncertainty.
Some would say that the preceding discussion is moot and that the
risk can be disregarded, for if the consent of the relatives alone or relatives
and deceased is received, there is no one around to bring a suit.6" This raises
the double-barreled question: from which relatives must consent be
obtained, and who has standing to sue? The type of suit brought is most
likely to be a civil one for compensatory damages for mental anguish
61 Law 'was Blind, 67 TIME 92 (March 19, 1956).
62 The Cadaver Business, supra note 24; Willed Bodies, supra note 24;
Your Body and Mine, supra note 57.
63 Homotransplantation, supra note 3.
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caused by mutilation of the body, and could be brought against the in-
dividual who dissected the body, the hospital or school which permitted the
dissection, or the relative who gave the permission. Also, all these parties
could be joined as joint tortfeasors. A disgruntled relative, or perhaps
even a stranger, could have criminal proceedings instituted under one of
the criminal statutes relating to unlawful dissection or mutilation.
The relative who is most likely to bring a civil action is the one
charged with the duty of burial. There is no question of his standing to sue
for violation of his right to possession of the body for purposes of burial.
This danger can be guarded against by obtaining his previous permission
whether it be for dissection for study, autopsy, autopsy with removal of
parts, or dissection solely for removal. If the permission is obtained before
death, not only the consent of the spouse but also that of all adult children,
including those from other marriages should be received. If the spouse
should expire 'before the one who is to be dissected, upon the latter's death
it will be the children who have the duty to bury and the cause of action.
If there is neither spouse nor children, the permission of both parents and
all brothers and sisters should be acquired. At the least, this permission
may estop the person who has given it from proceeding with the suit.
Since so many of the reported cases deal with controveries among
relatives as to disposition of a body, it is likely that relatives other than the
one who has the duty of burial and right to possession will be interested
in collecting a substantial verdict to heal their mental suffering over the
mutilation of the deceased. In those jurisdictions in which the courts hold
that only the kin having the duty of burial have protectable rights, these
other relatives will be denied a cause of action."" However, where it is
recognized that the right of burial depends partially upon the wishes of
surviving relatives or where the duty of burial is a "sacred trust" running
to other relatives, it seems that these relatives have clear standing to sue.65
Complete protection against this hazard is a practical impossibility. The
language of the courts is quite loose so that one could argue that almost
anyone who ever knew the deceased is entitled to a cause of action."6 This
is rather preposterous. It is felt that a fair degree of protection will be
achieved by having the consent of spouse, children, parents, brothers, and
sisters.
POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
The advances of medical science will continue to be hampered by
the absence of a sound legal status for the utilization of post mortem
human materials unless clarifying legislation is enacted. Such legislation
could take one or all of the forms discussed in the ensuing sections.
64 Trammel v. City of New York, supra note 20; Gostkowski v. Roman
Catholic Church, supra note 20.
65 Boyle v. Chandler, supra note 14.
66 The court in Larson v. Chase, supra note 11, states, "all are interested
who were allied to the deceased by the ties of family or friendship."
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Revamtsng the Anatomy Acts
The provisions of the anatomy acts could use overhauling. 7 Perhaps
it is time for the legislatures to assure that only personal friends of the
deceased may claim his body. Perhaps those who claim the -body after it
has been embalmed should be required to pay for the embalming. Cer-
tainly, either a time limit for claiming or a protection to the agency which
has dissected should be made so that there is no liability incurred for failure
to deliver the entire body when a request is made for it months or years
after death. There should be provision for and enforcement of notification
to the schools when a 'body is available. The requirement of interment
after dissection should be changed to allow for cremation. The prohibition
against removing bodies from the state should definitely be accompanied
by an exception which allows "transporting human specimens outside of the
state for the temporary use at scientific meetings or exhibits."6 "
Clarifying Conflicting Social Legislation
The members of the medical profession have criticized the social
legislation providing funds for burial so heavily that one could draw the
conclusion that they would like to see this legislation changed. This writer
has no opinion as to whether or not such changes should be made, but urges
legislators to clarify apparent conflicts between social legislation and the
anatomy acts so that local officials will know whether the body must be
buried or whether it must be delivered to a medical school.
Instituting a Basis for Donation
This writer is convinced that legislation forming the basis for dona-
tion of bodies for anatomical study or therapeutics is the most desirable and
practical solution to the problems of cadaver supply. The results in those
states with such legislation have been very favorable. n9 Within a two year
period the University of California at Los Angeles received 300 donations;
in about the same length of time the Anatomical Board of Florida had
received 138 bodies and had on file 75 other wills or statements of persons
wishing to donate their bodies to science. 70 Even though there is no legal
basis for it, one of the Ohio medical schools reports that its three year pro-
gram to encourage donations is successful. 7 It is believed that through
donations, encouraged largely by the success of therapeutic transplantations,
the various medical schools and banks could acquire a more than ample
supply of cadaver material. As compared to the anatomy laws, where the
body of an unclaimed indigent is simple "taken," a donation system is
much more acceptable to the public for the reason that the deceased him-
self has made the choice. It is also the only way by which the consent of
the relatives could be obtained. By cooperation between the anatomy de-
67 See discussion of inadequacies, supra page 463.
68 See Appendix I for citations-to similar exceptions.
69 See Appendix II for citations of these statutes.
70 Willed Bodies, supra note 24; Florida-Where There Isn't Any Trouble,
supra note 37; Your Body and Mine, supra note 57.
71 Sourse of information withheld.
[Vol. 19
COMMENTS
partments and banks the same body could be used to a limited extent by
both. It would even be feasable for the eyes to be removed immediately
after death, for embalming to be done under instructions from the anato-
my department, a normal funeral held, anatomical study made, and the
remains delivered to relatives for burial in the family cemetery plot.7"
This entails good public relations and efficient administration which is
difficult to accomplish when the legal status of all actions is doubtful.73
The number of conflicting interests in need of protection renders it
difficult to draft good legislation on this subject. The very fact that legis-
lation is enacted will mean that the public policy or community sentiment
favors post mortem use of the human body by science. However, there
must be some assurance that the deceased really wanted this use made of
his body-just as the law does its best to assure that his disposition of pro-
perty is really his wish. Second, the emotional entanglements surrounding
death are such that some consideration should be given to protecting the
desires of close surviving relatives. Third, the people of the medical pro-
fession who will be using these bodies should be protected against liability
for reasonable and innocent mistakes. According protection to all these
interests when the body is to be used for scientific purposes is complicated
by the fact that the body must be secured by the medical people quickly
after death.
In the fifteen states which have statutory language apparently allow-
ing donation of one's -body to science the balance of protection among these
interests is not necessarily the best that could be achieved.74 The statutory
provisions in six of these states are not clearly designed to implement dona-
tion of bodies to science. In New York and North Dakota the provision
is that a person has the right to direct the manner in which his body shall be
disposed. The New York courts have held that this disposition is subject
to the desires of relatives in some cases.76 The Oregon statute gives certain
kin the right to control "disposition" of the body "unless other directions
have been given by" the deceased. Washington, North Dakota, Nevada,
and Montana limit autopsies or dissection with the permission of relatives
to ascertainment of the cause of the death, but with permission of the de-
ceased there is no such limitation. Most of these statutes should be amended
to make clear that they do facilitate donation of one's body to science.
72 Your Body and Mine, supra note 57.
73 For example, the author of the following excerpt cannot openly develop
his program for donations. "I have enclosed two letters and a form which I send
to people who would like to donate their bodies to me. I would appreciate any
comments from you on the legality of this form for I have not actually had it
tested. As you very well know, the thing is complicated and I fully expect to find
myself in trouble as a result of this particular endeavor. However, there are many
people who inquire concerning methods of doing this, and I think it is something
that we must follow along . . .medicine would be sent back into the dark ages
without bodies for dissecting purposes." (Source of information withheld.)
74 See Appendix II for citations of all the statutes discussed herein.
75 Matter of Schenk, supra note 57.
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The legislation in the other nine states has been enacted since 1947
and is specifically tailored to allow donations. All of them attempt to
protect the wishes of the deceased. In six of the states the donor must be
otherwise capable of making a will or be over twenty-one years of age
and of sound mind. Limitations as to the nature of the donative instrument
vary from the requirement that it must be executed as a deed and recorded,
to the allowance of any written instrument. It seems that a written instru-
ment witnessed by two people not connected with the donee agency would
assure that the donation was the deceased's wish and at the same time not
require a cumbersome process.
The Maine statute is the only one which provides that there must be
no objection from relatives.7" Such protection should not be so great as to
hamper unduly the use of the body for transplantation or anatomical
study; therefore it is suggested that only those relatives who are very
close to the deceased, such as spouse and children, should be protected. It
would be most convenient for -both transplantation and anatomical study
if legislation would require consent before, rather than after, death, per-
haps near the time the donative instrument is executed.
The attempts to protect the medical profession have been particularly
unsatisfactory. Three states provide that if a donee is not named "any
available physician or surgeon" shall be considered the donee. Possible con-
fusion would be avoided by a more specific designation such as the state
anatomy -board, chairman of the department of anatomy at the nearest
school, or a particular hospital official. The statutory solutions employed
at present to solve the time problem have the virtue of being certain but
appear too stringent. Making interference with the donation a criminal
offense accords no protection whatsoever to the relatives or deceased.
Under these statutes it would be courting crime to raise the objection that
the donative instrument was a complete forgery. On the other hand, the
Arizona exemption from liability is limited to acts performed "in carrying
out instructions of the donor or testator. . . ." This gives no protection to
the person who reasonably believes that he is carrying out the instructions
of the deceased but, in fact, has made an innocent mistake. Although it is
an overused, suggestion, it appears that the great savior of all difficult legal
problems would be apropos, "reasonableness." The deceased and relatives
need to be protected against fraudulent or arbitrary practices, but the
scientist should also have some protection against an innocent error. A
statutory exception from liability in cases of reasonable mistakes or in the
absense of fraudulent acts is appropriate.77
76 It is interesting to note that even among the medical profession there is
a decided interest in protecting the wishes of surviving relatives. Florida-Where
There Isn't Any Trouble, supra note 37; Your Body and Mine, supra note 57;
personal communications, (sources of information withheld.)
77 For other suggested changes see Woodburne & Gardner, supra note 24.
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The adoption of legislation following one or more of the forms dis-
cussed here would certainly prevent a recurrence of the nineteenth century





ALA. CODE tit. 22, §174 (1940)
A Iz. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-801 (1956) -------
ARK. STAT. §82404 (194-7)
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7200 ----------
CONN. GEN. STAT. §4214 (1949)------
COLO, REV. STAT. ANN. §91-3-1 (1953) ----
DELAWARE-None-----------------------_
D.C. CODE ANN. §2-201 (1951)-------------
FLA. STAT. ANN. §24-5.01 (Supp. 1957) ------
GA. CODE ANN. §88-701 (1933)--------
IDAHO-None
ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 91, §19 (Smith-Hurd 1956)
IND. ANN. STAT. §63-601 (1951)
IOWA CODE ANN. §142.1 (Supp. 1957) -------
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §65-901 (1949) ------
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §311.300 (1955) --------
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §17:2271 (1951) -------
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 66, §11 (1954)_...
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §158 (1951) --------
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 113, §1 (1957) ---------
MICH. STAT. ANN. §14.511 (1956)
MINN. STAT. ANN. §145.14 (1946) -----------
Miss. CODE ANN. §6709 (1952)
Mo. ANN. STAT. §194.120 (1952)
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §69-2301 (1953) ....
NEB. REV. STAT. §71.1001 (1950) ------------
NEvADA-None.............................
N .H . R E V . S T A T . A N N . § 2 9 1 :1 ( 1 9 5 5 ) --------
N.J. STAT. ANN. §45:943 (1940)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §12-7-1 (1953) ------------
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH §4200 ......
N.C. GEN. STAT. §90.211 (1950)-_
N.D. REv. CODE §23-0603 -------------------
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1713.34 (Page 1954)._
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §91 (1949) --------
ORE. REV. STAT. §97.130 (1957)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 35, §1091 (1949) --------
RHODE ISLAND--None----------------------
S.C. CODE §9-501 (1952)-------------------
SOUTH DAKOTA-None----------------------
TENN. CODE ANN. §53-504- (1955)- --
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4583 (1951).-
UTAH CODE ANN. §53-31-30 (1953) ---------
VT. STAT. §6742 (1947)---------------------
VA. CODE ANN. §32-354 (1950)------------
WASH. REV. CODE §68.08.060 (1951)
NV. VA. CODE ANN. §1884 (1955)
Vis. STAT. §155.02 (1955)----------- --
VYo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. §63-801 (1945) -----
- 0
- 0
















ALA. CODE tit. 22, §184(1) (1940) ---------- 1949 x X
ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-841 (1956) ---- 1954 x x x
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §7100 -------- 1947 x X X
FLA. STAT. ANN. §245.11 (Supp. 1957) --- 1953 x
IOWA CODE ANN. §142.12 (Supp. 1957) --- 1955 x x
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §17:2351 (1951) ------- 1950 x x
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 66, §10 (1954) .... 1951 1
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §69.2308 (1953) .... 1943 x x
NEv. REv. STAT. §451.010 (1957) ----------- 1911
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH §4201 ----------------- 1881
N.C. GEN. STAT. §90.216.1 (1950) ---------- 1951 x x x
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §105 (Supp. 1957) 1957 x x x
ORE. REV. STAT. §97.130 (1957) ----------- 1947
WASH. REV. CODE §68.08.100 (1951) ------- 1909
